A well-known result of D. Leivant states that, over basic Kalmar elementary arithmetic EA, the induction schema for n formulas is equivalent to the uniform re ection principle for n+1 formulas. We show that fragments of arithmetic axiomatized by various forms of induction rules admit a precise axiomatization in terms of re ection principles as well. Thus, the closure of EA under the induction rule for n (or n+1 ) formulas is equivalent to ! times iterated n re ection principle. Moreover, for k < !, k times iterated n re ection principle over EA precisely corresponds to the extension of EA by k nested applications of n induction rule.
Introduction
It is well known that rst order theories can be de ned, over rst order logic, by sets of axioms as well as by sets of rules. An axiom can be viewed as a particular kind of rule with an empty, or with some xed, trivial premise. Vice versa, for a theory T axiomatized by rules, all theorems of T constitute a trivial axiomatization of T by a set of axioms. So, if one identi es a theory with its set of provable theorems | a point of view supported by the model-theoretic tradition in logic | there is no essential di erence between rules and axioms.
Recently, a new interest was aroused in proof-theory towards the questions of a more \intensional", syntax-depending character. One can mention the active research being done in the area of complexity of proofs; propositional proof systems (cf, e.g., 5]); investigations on so-called Kreisel's Conjecture (cf, e.g., 1]). These developments are mainly inspired by potential applications in Theoretical Computer Science, rather than by purely foundational questions. On the other hand, they are very essential for proof theory itself, for in all these areas the existing proof-theoretic techniques cannot be completely replaced by the alternative model-theoretic ones, because of the intensional character of problems.
This paper is devoted to a detailed proof-theoretic analysis of restricted induction rules in arithmetic. Our main results characterize closures of arithmetical theories containing EA by induction rules in terms of axioms. These results have intensional character in the sense that we are looking for natural and informative axiomatizations, rather than for easy but useless ones.
Although logicians usually have a very good intuition about particular axiomatizations, the general question \What is a natural axiomatization of a formal theory?" is somewhat vague from strictly mathematical point of view. 1 In our case we have both informal and formal evidence to the e ect that axiomatizations by rules and their equivalent characterizations by axioms (re ection principles) are`naturally related' to each other:
(a) Re ection principles are well-studied schemata in proof theory, with a clear (meta)mathematical meaning.
(b) Our characterizations are informative in the sense that they yield several interesting corollaries concerning nite (non)axiomatizability of theories given by induction rules, optimal complexity of their axiomatizations, and give wide su cient conditions for the equivalence of (closures of theories by) n+1 and n induction rules. Besides, they allow to give new proofs of several old`extensional' results, such as the conservativity results for induction schemata over induction rules, characterizations of provably (total) recursive functions of theories axiomatized by rules, Peter's theorem on nested recursion, and others.
(c) The structure of the axiomatizations by iterated re ection principles pre-cisely corresponds to the structure of nestings of applications of induction rules. The latter, more formal, kind of evidence will be carefully explained below. For further discussion we must x some terminology and formulate a few background results.
Kalmar elementary arithmetic EA is a theory known in several equivalent formulations. When formulated in the standard language of Peano arithmetic PA it has the name I 0 +EXP and is axiomatized by restricting, in the standard formulation of PA, the schema of induction A(0)^8x(A(x) ! A(x + 1)) ! 8xA(x) (1) to bounded formulas A(x) and by adding a 2 axiom stating that the function 2 x is total. It is well-known that I 0 + EXP is a nitely axiomatizable theory 3].
In an alternative formulation, the language of EA contains function symbols for all Kalmar elementary functions, and mathematical axioms of EA are (1) (open) de ning equations for all these functions; (2) the schema of induction for open formulas. It is known that EA admits a purely universal (or quanti er free) axiomatization in this language. The two formulations of EA are equivalent in the sense that the second theory can be viewed as a conservative`extension by de nitions' of the rst one.
Switching between the two di erent axiomatizations of EA is technically useful and will be exploited below. Let us also mention the fact that there exists a nite, purely universal formulation of EA in a language with symbols for nitely many elementary functions. This fact is closely related to a well-known theorem, originally due to R odding, stating that the class of Kalmar elementary functions has a nite basis under composition (see, e.g., 8, 10] ). We shall sketch a proof of this useful fact, as well as that of nite basis theorem, in Section 4.
It is known that EA is strong enough to reasonably formalize syntax, provability, G odel's incompleteness theorems, partial truthde nitions (see 3] ). In this paper we take EA as a base theory, that is, all theories considered below are assumed to contain EA.
C. Parsons was probably the rst to systematically study fragments of PA obtained by restricting various forms of induction to classes of the arithmetic hierarchy. In 11, 12] , among other things, he showed that, over EA, the induction schema (1) for n formulas A(x), denoted n -IA, is strictly stronger than the corresponding induction rule for n formulas, n -IR:
A(0); 8x(A(x) ! A(x + 1))`8xA(x):
Parsons demonstrated that many other natural forms of restricted induction over EA are equivalent to one of these two. In particular, for n 1, EA + n -IA EA + n -IA;
(this theory is also often denoted I n ) and EA + n -IR EA + n+1 -IR: (3) Here the expression T U means that the theories T and U are deductively equivalent, i.e., have the same set of theorems.
Despite the two results looking very similar, they are rather di erent in nature, as the reader familiar with their proofs undoubtedly feels. There are more formal reasons for such a feeling. Equivalence (2) actually holds over any theory T containing EA, and this indicates a really tight relationship between the two axiom schemata. On the other hand, it is well-known that equivalence (3) may cease to be true for some theories stronger than EA. For example, I 1 + 1 -IR I 1 6 I 1 + 2 -IR; because I 1 + 2 -IR proves the consistency of I 1 , e.g., by our results in Section 3. This shows that, from some sharper point of view, 1 -IR and 2 -IR are substantially di erent rules. In order to accurately formulate this point of view we adopt a few rather general de nitions.
Since the rules we deal with in this paper are typically schematic rules, we say that a rule is a set of instances, that is, expressions of the form A 1 ; : : : ; A n B ; where A 1 ; : : : ; A n and B are formulas. Derivations using rules are de ned in the standard way; T + R denotes the closure of a theory T under a rule R and rst order logic. T; R] denotes the closure of T under unnested applications of R, that is, the theory axiomatized over T by all formulas B such that, for some formulas A 1 ; : : : ; A n derivable in T, A 1 ;:::;An B is an instance of R.
De nition 1. Let R 1 and R 2 be rules. R 1 is reducible to R 2 (denoted R 1 R 2 )
i , for every theory T containing EA, T; R 1 ] T; R 2 ]. R 1 and R 2 are congruent (R 1 = R 2 ) i R 1 R 2 and R 2 R 1 . Informally, R 1 R 2 means that an arbitrary application of R 1 can be modeled over EA by unnested applications of R 2 . Notice that is re exive and transitive, so that = is an equivalence relation. Also notice that the notion of congruence does not depend on the choice of a base theory. For the purposes of this paper we may safely identify congruent rules. We say that a rule R is congruent to a set of axioms U, i R is congruent to U considered as a trivial schematic rule (with the empty premise). Equivalently, i T; R] T + U for any theory T extending EA. Notice that rules congruent to axiom schemata have a trivial behaviour in the sense that they cannot be applied fruitfully more than once: nested applictions of such rules do not yield new theorems.
De nition 2. R 1 is derivable from R 2 (denoted R 1 R 2 ) i for any application Example. We have seen that 2 -IR 6 1 -IR, although the closure of EA under each of these rules is the same. On the other hand, obviously 1 -IR 2 -IR. Corollary 2.1 in Section 2 shows that n -IR n -IR but not vice versa. The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we classify various forms of induction rules modulo congruence relation. We shall show that these rules, most commonly, fall into one of the three distinct categories: (a) rules congruent to induction axiom schemata; (b) rules congruent to n induction rule n -IR; (c) rules congruent to n induction rule n -IR. (An interesting candidate for falling out of this classi cation is the induction rule for boolean combinations of 1 formulas, which is derivable from, but possibly not reducible to, n -IR; see below.)
The question of the axiomatizability of rules of category (a) is trivially settled. So, in the remaining part of the paper we analyze the other two cases. In Section 3 we introduce re ection principles and characterize n -IR. A similar characterization of n -IR is more di cult and is given in Section 7 for 1 -IR, and in Section 8 for n -IR, n > 1. The characterization of 1 -IR requires a rather careful analysis of provably recursive functions of theories axiomatized by this rule. In Section 4 we recall basic facts about provably recursive functions and formulate an easy characterization of these functions for closures of 2 axiomatized theories by 1 -IR. In Section 5 we analyze the question, when the class of provably recursive functions of a theory is elementarily closed. A natural su cient condition is formulated in terms of 1 collection rule. In Section 6, on the basis of these results, we construct a suitable universal function for the class of provably recursive functions of a nite 2 axiomatized extension of EA using only unnested applications of 1 -IR over that theory. This allows us to obtain in Section 7 the required characterization of 1 -IR, and subsequently relativize it to n -IR for n > 1.
It should be said that in the proof of our main results we did not try to be overly laconic. We have included proofs of several results which were formally never used in the main proofs, like the above mentioned theorem of R. Peter on nested recursion. Or results the use of which could be avoided, like the nite basis theorem for Kalmar elementary functions. It seems to us that proofs of these easy facts (modulo the rest of our techniques) would enhance the reader's general understanding of peculiar phenomena treated in this paper, so we decided to include them. The results of Section 3 of this paper have been earlier announced in 2].
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The paper owes much to participants of the seminar`Arithmetic Colloquium', particularly to D. 2 Basic equivalences C. Parsons showed that many natural forms of induction (of restricted arithmetical complexity) over EA are equivalent to either n -IR or n -IA. In this section we obtain a few more results of this kind. We classify various forms of induction rules modulo the sharper congruence relation. Some of Parsons' equivalences then turn out to be congruences, whereas some others do not. We also examine a few rules that have not been considered by Parsons. In addition to IR we consider the following forms of induction rule:
As usual, for ? a class of arithmetical formulas, ?-IR 0 , ?-IR < , and ?-LR will denote the above rules with the restriction that A 2 ?. We also assume that formulas A(x) may contain free parameters other than x. Proposition 2.1. n -IR 0 = n -IR 0 = n -IR Proof. 1 . The congruence n -IR 0 = n -IR 0 is proved in analogy with the proof of the equivalence of n -IA and n -IA (cf 12]). For example, to show that n -IR 0 n -IR 0 consider a formula A(x) 2 n such that T`8x (A(x) ! A(x + 1)):
Then for B(a; Notice that similar trick does not work with the rule IR.
2. Obviously, n -IR n -IR 0 and n -IR n -IR 0 . So, it only remains to show that n -IR 0 n -IR. Let 9yA(y; x) 2 n with A(y; x) 2 n?1 , and let T`8x (9yA(y; x) ! 9yA(y; x + 1)):
Then we have T`8x (9y (A(a; 0) ! A(y; x)) ! 9y (A(a; 0) ! A(y; x + 1))) and obviously T`9y (A(a; 0) ! A(y; 0)):
It follows that T; n -IR]`8x9y (A(a; 0) ! A(y; x)) 9uA(u; 0) ! 8x9y A(y; x); q.e.d. Corollary 2.1. n -IR n -IR: Proof: via n -IR 0 . Also notice that n -IR 6 n -IR, because, for example, EA + 2 -IR contains I 1 , whereas EA + 2 -IR, being deductively equivalent to PRA, does not. Proposition 2.2. n -IR < = n -IR, n -IR < = n -IR Proof. The only nontrivial reduction is n -IR < n -IR. (Notice that, if A(x) 2 n , the formula 8y x A(y) need not be equivalent to a n -formula in absense of n -collection principle, and so the obvious argument does not work.) Suppose T`8x (8y < x A(y) ! A(x)); (4) where A( and so, such a rule can nontrivially be applied only once. The reader, however, should keep in mind that not every rule with this property is congruent to a set of axioms (for each T the set U may be di erent). We shall encounter one important rule of this sort, 1 -collection rule, later on in the paper. Also notice that in order to demontstrate R = U it is enough to check that EA; R] contains U and that T + U is closed under R for every theory T.
Of the rules congruent to axiom schemes the most obvious one is the usual Gentzen-style rule of induction, which can also be called \the induction rule with side formulas". In Hilbert-style formulation it may look, e.g., as follows:
It is well-known that, whenever the complexity of the formula A is restricted to, say, n , this rule provides an alternative axiomatization of I n (over EA). Moreover, the reader may easily check that to derive an instance of n -IA only one application of the rule is necessary. On the other hand, the fact that T + n -IA is closed under the induction rule with side formulas is obvious, hence the rule is congruent to n -IA. Of course, such an e ect is only possible because no restriction was imposed on the arithmetical complexity of the`side formula' B. Proof. To derive an instance of n -IA apply IR to the following 0 ( n ) formula:
where A(x) 2 n .
To show that T + n -IA is closed under 0 ( n )-IR for each theory T notice that an even stronger fact is known: I n contains 0 ( n )-IA (cf 12] or 3], Lemma 2.14, p. 65), q.e.d.
The above proposition has a somewhat paradoxical consequence that 0 ( 1 )-IR turns out to be actually stronger than 2 -IR over EA. This looks strange because we all are used to the fact that in the standard model of arithmetic 0 ( 1 ) sets are 2 and hence strictly lower in the hierarchy than 2 sets. No contradiction in mathematics arises from this because EA is a weak enough theory to think (or rather, not to exclude) that 0 ( 1 ) sets can be very complex. In fact, Proposition 2.3 provides a relevant instance of 1 -IA of the form (5) as an example to this e ect. Now we are ready to examine the least element rule LR. Proposition 2.4. n -LR = 0 ( n )-LR = n -LR Proof. 1 . The rst congruence is proved very similarly to the quoted Lemma 2.14 of 3]. We only sketch the argument. We say that A is piecewise coded in a theory T i T`8z9q \q is a z-piece of A": It is readily seen that the class of formulas piecewise coded in a theory T containing EA is closed under boolean connectives and bounded quanti ers. Now we show that the theory EA; n -LR] piecewise encodes all n -formulas. Indeed, for any such formula A(x) we obviously have EA`9q (q : 0; a] k ! f0; 1g^8x a (A(x) ! q(x) = 1)); because, e.g., one may take for q the function identically equal to 1. Applying n -LR once we get the minimal such q. It faithfully encodes the a-piece of A because the standard coding of nite functions has the property that functions with smaller values are assigned smaller codes. It follows that all n , and hence all 0 ( n ), formulas are piecewise coded in EA; n -LR].
Now it is easy to derive 0 ( n )-LR. Let EA`9xA(x), where A(x) 2 0 ( n ). The last rule we shall consider in this section is the induction rule for boolean combinations of n formulas, B( n )-IR. This rule is of interest because it is derivable from n -IR, as we shall see below, but, most probably, is not reducible to it. The following lemma is well-known and can be proved by purely propositional manipulations. First we shall show that T proves 8x (( (x) ! A 1 (x)) ! ( (x + 1) ! A 1 (x + 1))):
To this end we derive A 1 (x+1) from two assumptions: (x) ! A 1 (x) and (x+1).
(from 2,4) 6: 1 (x)^A 1 (x) (from 3,5) 7: 1 (x + 1)^A 1 (x + 1) (by 6 and (6)) 8: A 1 (x + 1) (by 7), and this proves (7).
Now we notice that the formula (x) ! A 1 (x) is logically equivalent to :(( ^ 2 )^:( 3^: : :^: k ) : : :);
that is, has rank k ?1. By the induction hypothesis we may conclude that the formula
is provable in T + n -IR 0 . It follows that so is the formula
Since the formula A 1 has the form :( 2^A2 ), where A 2 has rank k ? 2, from (8) we conclude
:
(10) Now we shall derive
( (9); 2) 5: A 1 (x) 6: 1 (x)^A 1 (x) (3; 5) 7: 1 (x + 1)^A 1 (x + 1) (by (6)) 8: (x + 1) (7; 3)
Since : 2 (0) ! (x) is a n formula, by IR 0 using Proposition 2.1 we obtain (: 2 (0) ! (0)) ! (: 2 (0) ! 8x (x)); and hence
(11) Similarly, using (10) and induction on :A 2 (0) ! (x); (12) we can derive
(It has to be noticed that the rank of formula (12) is at worst (k ?2)+1 = k ?1, so the induction hypothesis (6) is applicable.)
Putting (11) and (13) together we may conclude that T + n -IR 0 proves
that is,
and together with (8) this yields
as required, q.e.d. Initial values of f are 1; 2; 4; 6; 12; 18; 36; : : :; notice that f grows exponentially. I do not know if this result is optimal, that is, if the exact values of f can be decreased. Later, when analysing the relationship between n+1 and n induction rules, we shall nd out that for a certain class of base theories T the exponential number of applications of n -IR can dramatically be reduced to a single application, but I do not know if this is true for arbitrary theories.
Open question: is B( n )-IR congruent to n -IR? 3 n induction rule
In this section we give a characterization of n -IR in terms of iterated re ection principles. Re ection principles, for an r.e. arithmetical theory T, are formal schemata expressing the soundness of T, that is, the statement that \every sentence provable in T is true". More precisely, if Prov T (x) denotes the canonical 1 provability predicate for T, then the (uniform) re ection principle for T is the schema
for all formulas A(x). This schema is denoted RFN(T ). Partial re ection principles are obtained from it by imposing a restriction that the formula A may only range over a certain subclass ? of the class of T-formulas. Such schemata will be denoted RFN ? (T ), and for ? one usually takes one of the classes n or n of the arithmetical hierarchy. The following two basic facts on uniform re ection principles are well-known (cf 21]) and easy: 1) RFN n (T ) is equivalent to RFN n+1 (T ) over EA, for n 1. RFN 1 (T ) is equivalent to Con(T ), the consistency assertion for T.
2) The schema RFN n (T ) is equivalent to a single n sentence (over EA). This essentially follows from the existence of partial truthde nitions.
A old and well-known result of Kreisel and L evy 6] says that an alternative axiomatization of Peano Arithmetic over EA can be obtained by replacing the induction schema by the full uniform re ection principle for EA:
PA EA + RFN(EA): D. Leivant sharpened this result by showing that the hierarchies of restricted induction schemata and restricted re ection principles over EA actually coincide:
I n EA + RFN n+1 (EA): Here we establish a precise relationship between the n induction rule and the hierarchy of iterated re ection principles.
All theories in this section are formulated in the standard language of PA. I 0 + SUPEXP is the extension of EA by a 2 axiom asserting the totality of superexponentiation function 2 y x (cf 3]). A theory T is n axiomatized, if all of its nonlogical axioms are n sentences. Theorem 1. Let T be an arithmetical theory containing EA. Then, for any n 2, T; n -IR] is equivalent to T together with RFN n (T 0 ) for all nite n+1 axiomatized subtheories T 0 of T. This statement also holds for n = 1, provided T contains I 0 + SUPEXP.
Our proof of Theorem 1 is based upon quite standard techniques that combines Tarski's method of partial truthde nitions with the formalization of the Cut-elimination Theorem, and is, in fact, very close to the proof of Leivant's theorem (cf 7]). The proof admits an easy direct argument, without any use of skolemization. We need a few standard prerequisites.
Sequent calculus. We adopt a variant of the sequent calculus from 17], i.e., sequents are sets of formulas understood as big disjunctions, negations are treated via de Morgan's laws, etc.
Partial truth de nitions. There is a n formula True n (x), which adequately expresses the predicate \x is a G odel number of a true n sentence" in EA. 2 This means that True n (x) is well de ned on atomic formulas and provably in EA commutes with boolean connectives and quanti ers, i.e., satis es Tarski conditions for n formulas. As a result, for any A(x) 2 n , we have:
EA`8x (A(x) $ True n (pA( _ x)q)): (14) For our proof it will be essential that Tarski conditions not only hold locally, for each individual n formula, but also uniformly so. In other words, EA proves that, for all ; ; ; ; such that ; : ; ; ; 8x (x); 9x (x) are n sentences,
Let me stress that , ,: : : here are variables over G odel numbers of sentences, rather than individual sentences. (The standard dots-and-corners notation is somewhat sloppy in this respect. Yet, we hope that this will not create serious problems for the reader.)
On a par with the de nition of truth, we also have a reasonable evaluation of terms in EA, that is, a de nable Kalmar elementary function eval(u; x) which provably commutes with 0; 0 ; +; and therefore, for any term t(x 1 ; : : : ; x n ), satis es EA`8x 1 ; : : : ; x n eval(ptq; hx 1 ; : : : ; x n i) = t(x 1 ; : : : ; x n ):
Usually, eval(u; x) is explicitly used in the construction of a truthde nition for the evaluation of atomic formulas. This implies that the truthde nition and the evaluation of terms agree in the sense that, provably in EA, for all n formulas (a) and terms t(a), 8x; y eval(t; hxi) = y ! (True n (p (t( _ x))q) $ True n (p ( _ y)q))]; (15) and similarly for terms t and formulas in more than one free variable. Now let T be a nitely axiomatized theory, and let :T denote the negation of the conjuction of all axioms of T. Furthermore, let I T (m) denote the formula expressing the following:
\For all p, if p is a cut-free derivation of a sequent of the form :T; (a), where (a) contains n formulas only and a stands for all the free variables in , and if the height of p is < m, then 8x True n (p W ( _ x)q)." Clearly, I T (m) is a n formula. Lemma 3.1. Suppose T is a nite n+1 axiomatized extension of EA. Then T`I T (0)^8m (I T (m) ! I T (m + 1)): Proof. We reason informally within T. We may assume that the single nonlogical axiom of T has the form 8z: (z), where (z) is a n formula with n alternating leading quanti ers followed by a bounded formula. I T (0) trivially holds. We show that I T (m) implies I T (m + 1). Thus, we are given a cut-free derivation, of height m + 1, of a sequent of the form 9z (z); for a nite set of n formulas . We must show that the disjunction of is True, in the sense of True n , under every substitution of numerals for free variables in . For the rest of the proof we x an arbitrary substitution of this kind and treat as if it were a set of sentences. We distinguish several cases, according to the form of the last rule applied in the given derivation. Case 1. The sequent 9z (z); is a logical axiom, that is, has the form ?; ; : for some . Since 9z (z) is the only formula of the sequent that has complexity higher than n , both and : must belong to . Tarski commutation conditions then imply that True n (p: q) $ :True n (p q): So we obtain True n (p q) _ True n (p: q) and hence True n (p W q).
Case 2. The sequent 9z (z); is obtained by a rule introducing a logical connective into a formula from . All these rules are treated similarly using the subformula property of cut-free derivations and Tarski commutation conditions for True n . For example, the rule for the universal quanti er has the form 9z (z); 0 ; (a) 9z (z); 0 ; 8x (x) ; where a is not free in 0 . We must show that the formula W 0 _8x (x) is True. By the induction hypothesis, since a does not occur free in 0 , we know that, for each x, W 0 _ ( x) is True. Commuting True n with the small disjunction we conclude that, for each x, either W 0 or ( x) is True. Since 0 , and also True n (p 0 q), do not depend on x, it follows that either 0 is True, or for every x, ( x) is True. Commuting True n with the universal quanti er and then backwards with the disjunction we conclude that 0 _ 8x (x) is True, q.e.d.
In the remaining case we shall be more explicit about parameters. Case 3. The last rule introduces the existential quanti er in front of (z), i.e., our derivation has the form (9z (z)); (t(a)); (a) 9z (z); (a) :
A free variable a here stands for all the parameters on which and the term t may depend. Extra parentheses indicate that the formula 9z (z) in the premise may occur as well as not. Without loss of generality we may assume that it does occur. (Otherwise apply Weakening Lemma 2.3.1 from 17] in order to obtain a derivation of the same height where the formula in question occurs.) So, the induction hypothesis is applicable and implies that, for all x, either the disjunction of ( x), or (t( x)) is True. We must, reasoning inside T, refute the second alternative.
Notice that, although, in general, t is a \nonstandard" term, (z) is a xed \standard" n+1 formula. Therefore Tarski's commutation lemma (14) can be applied to (z), after evaluating the term t. Thus, by (15) and (14) we obtain:
Since the evaluation function is provably total in EA, it follows that True n (p (t( _ x))q) implies 9y (y) , that is, yields a contradiction in T. Thus, we see that, for any t and x, the formula (t( x)) cannot be True, hence True is the disjunction of ( x), q.e.d.
Proof of Theorem 1. 1. T; n -IR] is the theory axiomatized over T by all formulas 8xI(x) such that I(x) 2 n and T proves I(0)^8x (I(x) ! I(x + 1)):
Therefore, rst we must show that, for any such I(x), there is a nite n+1 axiomatized subtheory T 0 T such that T + RFN n (T 0 )`8xI(x): For the axioms of T 0 we simply take n+1 formula (16) together with all axioms of EA. Obviously, for every n we have T 0`I ( n). Furthermore, formalizing this fact in EA we obtain:
EA`8x Prov T 0 (pI( _ x)q):
This implies 8xI(x) by T 0 -re ection.
2. Now we must show that T; n -IR]`RFN n (T 0 ); for any nite n+1 axiomatized subtheory T 0 T. Let I T 0 (m) be the formula de ned in Lemma 3.1. Since T 0 T and I T 0 (m) 2 n , we conclude that
Notice that for T containing EA and n 2, obviously, T; n -IR]`SUPEXP:
On the other hand, it is well known (cf 3]) that I 0 + SUPEXP is a strong enough theory to prove the Cut-elimination Theorem for rst order logic. In order to derive RFN n (T 0 ) we reason inside T; n -IR], for every particular n formula A(x), as follows. Suppose Prov T (pA( _ x)q). Then the sequent :T; A( x) is logically provable. By (formalized) Cut-elimination Theorem we obtain a cut-free proof of this sequent, and by (17) conclude that True n (pA( _ x)q) holds. Tarski commutation lemma (14) then yields A(x), q.e.d.
The rest of this section is devoted to various remarks, corollaries and comments concerning Theorem 1. Let, for a xed n 1, (T ) n k denote the sequence of theories based on iteration of the n re ection principle over T:
Similarly, T; n -IR] k is de ned by repeated application of n -IR:
We obviously have
Since for r.e. T containing EA the schema RFN n (T ) is equivalent to a single n sentence, Theorem 1 can be applied repeatedly and we obtain Corollary 3.1. Let T be a nite n+1 axiomatized theory containing EA (or I 0 + SUPEXP for n = 1). Then T + n -IR (T ) n ! :
Moreover, for all k 1, we actually have
that is, k (nested) applications of induction rule precisely correspond to k iterations of re ection principle over T. Corollary 3.2. For theories T as in the above corollary the closure of T under n induction rule is a re exive theory, and hence it is not nitely axiomatizable, unless it is inconsistent. The same holds for any extension of T + n -IR by n sentences. T + 1 -IR T + Con(T ) + Con(Con(T )) + : : :
Clearly, for a sound theory T, T + 1 -IR is an extension of T by true 1 axioms, and hence both T and T + 1 -IR have the same class of provably recursive functions. Despite that, T + 1 -IR is stronger than T and the equivalence (18) gives us a precise measure of its relative strength. Remark 3.4. A characterization of 1 -IR for theories weaker than I 0 +SUPEXP can be obtained in the spirit of Wilkie and Paris 22] . In this situation the family of consistency assertions w.r.t. proofs of bounded cut-rank Con k (T ), k 0, plays the role of the single consistency assertion Con(T ) for T. Since EA is a strong enough theory to prove Cut-elimination Theorem for derivations of bounded cutrank, a quick inspection of the given proof of Theorem 1 yields the following result: for T containing EA, T; 1 -IR] is equivalent to T together with all Con k (U) such that k 0 and U is a nite 2 axiomatized subtheory of T.
Our next goal is the characterization of n induction rule in the spirit of Theorem 1. Parsons showed that n -IR is equivalent to n+1 -IR over EA. However, the two rules are not congruent and so, a more careful analysis is needed here. Let me explain why the simple proof of Theorem 1 cannot be easily adapted to the n case.
The technical reason is that the formula I T (m) in that proof involves a number of outer universal quanti ers, and therefore does not have the reqired n form. Some of these quanti ers, e.g., the quanti er over all derivations p, can actually be bounded. One can replace the induction on the height m of a proof by IR < over G odel numbers p of proofs using the fact that, under the standard coding, subderivations of p have smaller G odel numbers. However, there does not seem to be an easy way to get rid of the quanti er over all substitutions of numerals for free variables in the end-sequent. The only possibility here seems to be to keep those variables free, as the parameters of the formula I T . Yet, this possibility is blocked by the simple fact that, for large n, some sequents in the proof p may contain many more parameters than the end-sequent, and we ought to take them all into account. There is one rare situation where this di culty does not arise: simply, if there are no universal quanti ers in the end-sequent. This idea allows us to analyse the 1 induction rule. Then, by skolemization, we will be able to pull the result up in the arithmetical hierarchy. This project is carefully elaborated in the remaining part of the paper.
Provably recursive functions
In this section we recall some basic facts about provably (total) recursive functions (p.t.r.f.s) of theories and characterize these functions for closures of theories under 1 induction rule. Most of this material is fairly standard, so we are sketchy about proofs.
We shall deal with various classes of number-theoretic functions. The basic class is the class of elementary functions E. For a class K, C(K) denotes the closure of K E under composition. K; PR] denotes the closure of K under composition and one application of primitive recursion, i.e., the class C(F), where F is the set of all functions f(n; a) de Then it is not di cult to check that de nes a certain p.t.r.f. in T, is elementary, and for all n, f(n) = (g(n)) 1 ; q.e.d.
Since D(T) only depends on the 2 fragment of T, we shall concentrate our attention on 2 axiomatized theories.
De nition 5. Let := 8x9y (x; y) 2 2 , with elementary. A function f(x) is called a witness of i 8x (x; f(x)) holds in the standard model of arithmetic.
Every true 2 sentence has a witness. The function f (x) whose graph is de ned by the formula (x; y)^8z < y : (x; z) is called the standard witness of . Proposition 4.2. Let T be a nite 2 axiomatized sound extension of EA, and let f be the standard witness of the single axiom of T. Then D(T) = C(f). Proof. Obviously, f is a p.t.r.f. in T, and so C(f) D(T). The opposite inclusion is, more or less, a direct consequence of Herbrand's Theorem. Consider a purely universal formulation of EA (in a language with symbols for all Kalmar elementary functions), and add to this language a new function symbol f together with the axiom 8x (x; f(x)); where 8x9y (x; y) is the single axiom of T. Using appropriate Kalmar elementary terms we can get rid of all bounded quanti ers in . Hence the resulting theory is a conservative extension of T and has a purely universal axiomatization. Now suppose T`8x9!y9z 0 (x; y; z); where 0 is elementary (and in our formulation also quanti er-free). Since T has a purely universal axiomatization, by Herbrand's Theorem we obtain terms t 1 ; : : : ; t k ; u 1 ; : : : ; u k of the extended language such that T` 0 (a; t 1 (a); u 1 (a)) _ : : : _ 0 (a; t k (a); u k (a)): Clearly, the terms t i and u i represent functions in C(f). Now y; if z 6 = 0 is elementary, the class C(f) is closed under de nitions by cases and so, t(x) and u(x) can be adequately de ned by C(f) terms. For these terms we obviously have T` 0 (a; t(a); u(a)). It follows that T`8x9z 0 (x; t(x); z); and by the functionality of T`8x; y (t(x) = y $ (x; y)):
Since all theorems of T are true, represents the graph of t(x) in the standard model, q.e.d. Proof: Follows from the previous proposition and the fact that E has a nite basis (cf, e.g., 8, 10] ). It might be interesting for the reader to notice that, if we had been slightly more careful in the proof of Proposition 4.2, we could actually have inferred the existence of a nite basis in E from nite axiomatizability of EA.
Consider a nite 2 axiomatization of EA in the usual language of arithmetic (see 3]). Introduce nitely many (Kalmar elementary) functions to quanti erfree represent 0 parts of those 2 axioms. Then we have to introduce nitely many Skolem functions for these axioms in order to obtain a purely universal conservative extension of EA. Essentially the same proof as for Proposition 4.2 then shows that every provably recursive function can be de ned by a term in the extended language. In the process we would have to introduce a few more functions like Cond(x; y; z) or pairing functions. We omit the details, q.e.d. Proof. 1 . Let g(n; x) be de ned by a schema of primitive recursion ( g(0; x) = e(x) g(n + 1; x) = h(g(n; x); n; x); such that e; h 2 C(f). Since all functions in C(f) are p.t.r.f. in T, graphs of e and h are de ned by 1 formulas E(x; y) and H(z; n; x; y) := 9v H 0 (v; z; n; x; y), with H 0 elementary.
The graph of g is most naturally de ned (in the standard model) by the following formula (that uses elementary coding of sequences): g(n; x) = y :$ 9s 2 Seq ((s) 0 = e(x)^8i < n (s) i+1 = h((s) i ; i; x)^(s) n = y):
However, in absense of 1 collection principle this formula may not be equivalent to a 1 formula within T. We modify it as follows (a somewhat similar trick was employed earlier in the proof of Proposition 2.2): g(n; x) = y :$ 9s; v 2 Seq (E(x; (s) 0 )^8i < n H 0 ((v) i ; (s) i ; i; x; (s) i+1 )^(s) n = y): (19) This formula is obviously 1 , and now we shall show the totality of g in T; 1 -IR].
Clearly, T`9y g(0; x) = y, because e(x) is provably total. In order to see that T`8n (9y g(n; x) = y ! 9y g(n + 1; x) = y) we argue informally as follows. Suppose g(n; x) = y and thus we are given two sequences s and v of length n+1 satisfying (19) . We have to construct appropriate sequences of length n + 2. Since the function h is provably total, we can nd a z such that h(y; n; x) = z. Hence there is a w such that H 0 (w; y; n; x; z) holds. Pick any such w and add the element z to the end of the sequence s, and w to the end of v. The resulting sequences are as required. Applying 1 -IR we obtain:
T; 1 -IR]`8n; x9y g(n; x) = y: To prove the functionality of g we reason as follows. Let R(n; s; v; x; y) denote the elementary part of the formula (19) , and suppose we have R(n; s 1 ; v 1 ; x; y 1 ) and R(n; s 2 ; v 2 ; x; y 2 ). We prove 8i n (s 1 ) i = (s 2 ) i by induction on i (with n; s j ; v j ; x; y j as free paramemters). Notice that the induction is elementary, although it is applied as a schema rather than as a rule here. Basis and induction step follow at once from the functionality of e and h. So we obtain (s 1 ) n = (s 2 ) n , and therefore y 1 = y 2 . Notice that the argument for the functionality was actually carried out in T. Consider an arbitrary elementary formula A(x; y; a) such that T`9y A(0; y; a); and T`8x (9yA(x; y; a) ! 9yA(x + 1; y; a)): By Proposition 4.2 we obtain functions e(a) and h(y; x; a) in C(f) such that e witnesses 8a9y A(0; y; a), and h witnesses 8a; x; y9z (A(x; y; a) ! A(x + 1; z; a)):
Consider a primitive recursion ( g(0; a) = e(a) g(x + 1; a) = h(g(x; a); x; a):
Straightforward induction on x then shows that A(x; g(x; a); a) holds in the standard model for all x and a. This means that g(x; a) witnesses 8x; a9y A(x; y; a), q.e.d.
Elementary closure
As we have noted before, the class D(T) need not be elementarily closed even if the theory T contains EA. In this section we shall investigate this question in more detail and formulate su cient conditions for D(T) to be elementarily closed. Versions of the following two propositions can be found in 10] with more complicated proofs. 8x9y (x; y)`8x9y8u x9v y (u; v); where (x; y) 2 1 . Proof. Clearly, the formula 8x9y8u x9v y (u; v) implies 8x9y (x; y) in EA and is monotonic, whenever is elementary. So, we may apply 1 collection rule to all axioms of T and obtain a monotonic axiomatization.
In order to show that Statement 1 implies 2 we take an axiomatization of T over EA by 2 formulas whose standard witnesses are monotonic. Then we introduce Skolem functions for all these formulas and replace axioms := 8x9y (x; y) of T by their skolemizations 8x (x; f (x)): The resulting theory T proves monotonicity of all these functions f :
Besides, it is conservative over T, and has a purely universal axiomatization (if EA is taken in a universal formulation). Now assume T`8x9y (x; y) for a formula 2 1 . By Herbrand's Theorem we can obtain a monotonic term t(x) in the extended language such that T `8x9y t(x) (x; y):
(This actually is a version of Parikh's Theorem for T (cf 3],p. 272). Here we use the fact that every elementary function can be majorized by an increasing one, and hence any term in the extended language can.) Provable monotonicity of t(x) then implies:
T `8x9y =t(x) 8u x9v y (u; v):
The result follows by conservativity of T over T, q.e.d. Let f(x) be a function. Every function of the class C(f) can be represented by a term in a language containing a function symbol for f and nitely many function symbols for a certain basis in E (cf Proposition 4.1). We call these functions initial functions, and the terms of this language will be called f-terms. We x a natural elementary G odel numbering of f-terms.
The evaluation function eval f (e; x) for f-terms is de ned as follows: g(0; a) = g 0 (a) g(n + 1; a) = h(g(n; a); n; a); for some f-terms g 0 (a) and h(x; y; a). We shall express g(n; a) in the form eval f (s(n); hai); for a function s(n) to be found. Let num(n) denote the index of a constant f-term with value n, and let Sub xy (e; i; j) compute the index of an f-term that results in substitution of f-terms i and j for variables x and y respectively in an f-term e. It is easy to see that functions Sub and num are elementary. Then we can de ne s(n) as follows: ( s(0) := pg 0 q s(n + 1) := Sub xy (phq; s(n); num(n)): (20) It follows that ( eval f (s(0); hai) = g 0 (a) eval f (s(n + 1); hai) = h(eval f (s(n); hai); n; a): (21) So, it only remains to prove that primitive recursion (20) is bounded. Let jtj denote the length (= number of symbols) of a term with index t. For Sub we have the following estimate: jSub xy (e; i; j)j C jej max(jij; jjj); because the total number of occurrences of variables x and y in a term e is less than jej. On the other hand, the length of num(n) is at worst linear in n. So, for large enough n we have:
js(n + 1)j C 1 js(n)j: It follows that js(n)j grows at most exponentially, and thereby s(n) has a doubly exponential bound, q.e.d.
Two immediate consequences of the above proposition are:
Corollary 6.1. The class C(f); PR] is nitely based. Corollary 6.2. The class C(eval f ) is elementarily closed.
Another interesting corollary is the reduction of nested recursion to primitive recursion. A nested recursive de nition may have, e.g., the following form: ( g(0; a) = g 0 (a) g(n + 1; a) = h 0 (g(n; h 1 (g(n; a); a)); n; a):
In general one allows arbitrarily deep nestings of g-terms on the right hand side of the de nition, but g must only occur in the context g(n; ), that is, the rst argument must always be n. An old result of R.Peter says that nested recursion is reducible to primitive recursion, and it is relevant for our work as follows.
Suppose we want to evaluate a term t(u(x)), where t and u are complex terms. Doing this in the most straightforward manner we must rst evaluate u and then t, that is, eval f (pt uq; x) = eval f (ptq; eval f (puq; hxi)):
We see that eval f occurs doubly nested on the right hand side of the equation. The evaluation procedure prescribed by Proposition 6.1 is di erent: we look at the terms t and u as being decomposed into initial functions, and evaluate only one function at a step. This is a longer process, although it yields the same result.
A natural rule to verify the totality of functions de ned by nested recursion is 2 induction rule, rather than 1 -IR, which only works for primitive recursive de nitions on the face of it. 4 Therefore it is not surprising that Peter's theorem is an essential element in Parsons' proof of the equivalence of 2 and 1 induction rules. Here we obtain a slightly sharpened version of Peter's result for free. Corollary 6.3. The closure of a class K of functions containing E under one application of nested recursion and composition coincides with K; PR]. Proof. Without loss of generality we may assume that K has the form C(f). Now we almost literally follow the lines of the proof of the second part of Proposition 6.1. A function g(n; a) de ned by nested recursion from C(f) can be expressed in the form eval f (s(n); a) for a suitable elementary function s. The bound on the rate of growth of s, however, will be slightly worse than before. For su ciently large n we have js(n + 1)j C js(n)j k ; where k is the maximum depth of nestings in the de nition of g. However, this means that s grows no faster than triply exponentially, q.e.d.
Let T be nite 2 axiomatized extension of EA and let f be the standard witness for the single axiom of T. We shall show that the evaluation function for f-terms can be naturally represented in T; 1 -IR], and that its basic properties are provable in this theory. Essentially, the argument is a careful inspection of the proofs of Propositions 4.3 and 6.1, but there are a few di culties that we must explain how to avoid.
Without loss of generality we may assume that T is formulated in a language containing function symbols for f and for nitely many initial elementary functions. (However, when speaking about the complexity of formulas we shall always refer to their translations into the standard language of arithmetic. Recall that the graph of f is de ned by an elementary formula.) By Propositions 4.3 and 6.1 we know that eval f is provably recursive in T; 1 -IR], and hence its graph can be represented by a certain 1 formula. This formula can be read o from the primitive recursive de nition of eval f , or rather eval f , given in the proof of Proposition 6.1 and using the formalization of primitive recursion (19) in the proof of Proposition 4.3. All our considerations below will concern this particular formula.
Let EVAL f denote the 2 formula expressing the totality of eval f :
EVAL f := 8e; x9y eval f (e; x) = y:
First of all, we know that T; 1 Since we are working in the theory T, which does not prove the totality of eval f , the expression`eval f (e; x) = y' is understood here as a 1 predicate, rather than as an equality of two terms. The following two properties of this predicate can also be established within T:
1. T`8e; i; x (9y eval f (e; x) = y^i e ! 9y eval f (i; x) = y); 2. T`8e; x; y 1 ; y 2 (eval f (e; x) = y 1^e val f (e; x) = y 2 ! y 1 = y 2 ):
The rst property holds because the de nition of eval f is constructed via the function eval f , which presupposes a similar property. The second property follows from our proof of Proposition 4.3, because the argument for the uniqueness there requires only elementary induction. In particular, the latter property implies that we can introduce a function symbol for eval f within T; 1 -IR]. Thereby, inductive clauses ( ) can be reformulated in a more usual manner; for example, T; 1 -IR] proves eval f (Sub x 0 xm (phq; e 0 ; : : : ; e m ); x) = h(eval f (e 0 ; x); : : : ; eval f (e m ; x)); for any initial function h. We straightforwardly obtain the following standard corollary. Proposition 6.2. For any f-term t(x 1 ; : : : ; x n ), T; 1 -IR]`8x 1 ; : : : ; x n eval f (ptq; hx 1 ; : : : ; x n i) = t(x 1 ; : : : ; x n ):
Proof: induction on the buid-up of t, q.e.d.
To be able to more fruitfully use the inductive clauses for eval f we need a reasonable amount of induction for formulas involving eval f . This goal is somewhat problematic, because the graph of eval f is 1 , whereas the rule 1 -IR in our theory can only be applied once. Nevertheless, we have the following useful property. Proposition 6.3. The theory T; 1 -IR] contains the induction schema for bounded formulas in the language with a function symbol for eval f .
Proof. The idea is to use the fact that T; 1 -IR] is axiomatizable by monotonic 2 sentences, so that eval f can be replaced by an increasing function with an elementary graph.
First, formalizing the obvious proof of Proposition 4.1 we can nd a function eval 0 f such that eval 0 f has an elementary graph, the totality of eval 0 f is equivalent to EVAL f over EA, and provably in EA, eval f (e; x) = (eval 0 f (e; x)) 1 :
Now we de ne a function for nite 2 axiomatized theories T. Modulo the work we have done in the previous sections the argument will be similar to the one in Sieg 18] , Theorems 3.2 and 3.3.
We introduce a function symbol f for the standard witness for the single axiom of T and nitely many symbols for a suitable basis in E, so that T attains a purely universal axiomatization. It is also essential that the language of T is nite, and that T has only nitely many nonlogical axioms in the extended language.
We know that T; 1 -IR] has a reasonable evaluation function eval f for terms in the language of T. Using eval f rst we manufacture a satisfation predicate for quanti er free formuals of T. The following lemma is well-known and easy. So, Tarski commutation conditions are satis ed, and in the usual manner we obtain the following lemma. Since there are only nitely many subderivations of p, the quanti er over all q in this statement is bounded, and p appears as a free variable. So, the whole induction is an instance of 0 (eval f ) induction schema, which is available in T; 1 -IR] by Proposition 6.3. As usual, we consider several cases according to the last rule applied in the subderivation q. The cases of logical axioms and rules of propositional logic are easily treated using commutation properties for Sat f . The only nontrivial case is that of the existential quanti er. Suppose 9z (z) is one of the negated axioms This corollary allows to extend to 1 -IR all the facts concerning axiomatizability that we have obtained earlier for 2 induction rule. It should be stressed, however, that these results only apply for 2 axiomatized theories, rather than for general 3 (T 0 ). The opposite inclusion is proved in the usual way.
After the rst application of n+1 -IR we obtain a theory which is a n+2 axiomatized extension of a n+2 axiomatized theory containing I n . So, the second claim of the corollary follows by Corollary 8.1, q.e.d. Now we turn to the proof of Theorem 3. There are several ways one can go about relativization. Our method is similar to the one employed in Sieg 18 ] and Ono 9] , but has some additional twists. The general idea is to introduce enough Skolem functions in order to reduce Theorem 3 to 2 for a language with additional function symbols. However, in order to make this idea work one should be careful as to the choice of these Skolem functions, because the classes of functions we dealt with in the proof of Theorem 2 were not always elementarily closed.
Our rst goal is to restate Theorem 2 for a language with additional function symbols. Let (x) be a function. Relativized analogues of classes of functions considered in the proof of Theorem 2 are de ned as follows.
Notice that C (f) = C( ; f), by Proposition 5.1.
Let 0 ( ) denote the class of bounded formulas in the language of EA (with symbols for all Kalmar elementary functions) enriched by a function symbol for . 1 formulas are those of the form 9x 1 ; : : : ; x n A(x 1 ; : : : ; x n ; a), where A 2 0 ( ).
Classes n and n are de ned in a similar manner.
Relativized version of Kalmar elementary arithmetic, EA , is a theory formulated in the language with a function symbol for . In addition to the usual axioms of EA it has a schema of induction for 0 ( ) formulas. This formulation of EA is not purely universal because of the presence of bounded quanti ers. We show how to reformulate it in a purely universal way.
First of all, we show that one can naturally 0 ( ) de ne the graph of and prove in EA that this relation de nes a total function. For example, one can rst de ne an auxiliary function t(x) by t(x) := z x: 8i x (i) (z):
The graph of t is clearly 0 ( ), and since t(x) x holds provably in EA , the totality of t is easily proved by 0 ( ) induction. So, we introduce a function symbol for t and then de ne m( The following two useful properties of the function are obviously provable in EA .
Notice that any two terms satisfying the above equations are provably equal in EA . We shall denote G(x; a) by P i x g(i; a). A similar lemma holds for bounded multiplication. Conclude P x y (x; a) = 0. Notice that the induction here, being applied as a schema, does not involve the side formula 8x y (x; a) (which is not quanti er free), q.e.d. >From Lemma 8.2 it follows that, using open induction only, we can prove all instances of 0 ( ) induction in EA . Now we notice that the function can be de ned by a term in EA : (x) := ( (x)) x : This means that 0 ( ) induction is reducible to 0 ( ) induction, and we may conclude that EA is equivalent to EA , since the two interpretations we constructed are mutually inverse, q.e.d. Proposition 8.2. EA has a purely universal axiomatization (in the language with symbols for and for all elementary functions).
Proof. In the standard axiomatization of EA the instances of quanti er free induction A(0)^8y x (A(x) ! A(x + 1)) ! 8y xA(y) are bounded, but not literally quanti er free. We show that in an axiomatization of EA these formulas can be replaced by quanti er free ones. To this end we have to improve a little upon Lemma 8.2. We show that in the proof of Lemma 8.2 only a number of purely universal theorems of EA could be used.
Indeed Proof. We check that everything in the proof of Theorem 2 relativizes. (Notice that the relativized theorem is formulated in such a way that nite axiomatizability of EA is not used.) We take a purely universal formulation of EA and introduce a new function symbol f for the standard witness of the (single) 2 axiom of T. At the cost of introducing into the language of T nitely many function symbols for elementary (in ) functions, and adding nitely many purely universal axioms of EA we may assume that the graph of f is open and T has a nite purely universal axiomatization in the language with f. Step (a) relativizes simply because C (f) = C( ; f). So, relativizing the rst part of Proposition 4.3 we obtain a 1 de nition of the evaluation function eval f (e; x) for terms in the language of T, and show its totality and natural properties in EA + T; 1 -IR]. This only depends on the assumption that f has a 0 ( ) graph and that EA contains enough 0 ( ) induction. This accounts for (b).
The proof of (c) depends on the results of Section 5, most notably on Lemma 5.4. These results relativize as they are, using the fact that the function is provably increasing. Then the proof of relativized Proposition 6.3 is also unproblematic. This gives us a natural satifaction predicate in EA + T; 1 -IR] for quanti er free formulas of T, Sat f (e; x). The proof of (d) is no di erent from Proposition 7.1. Here we essentially rely on the fact that T is a nite and purely universal theory, q.e.d. To this end rst we introduce Skolem functions in order to eat up the innestings of applications of induction rules. This shows, in particular, that the two ways of axiomatizing theories are tightly related. Besides, these characterizations yield several important corollaries concerning nite (non)axiomatizability of theories axiomatized by induction rules, optimal complexity of their axiomatizations, and give wide su cient conditions for the equivalence of (closures of theories by) n+1 and n induction rules.
Proof-theoretic analysis of provably recursive functions of theories axiomatized by rules allows us to sharpen, and give easy new proofs of, several old results. For example, we prove Peter's theorem on reduction of nested recursion to primitive recursion and Finite Basis Theorem for Kalmar elementary functions. We also reproduce some results of Parsons 12] and Sieg 18, 19] , e.g., we
show that Parsons' result on 2 conservativity of I 1 over 1 -IR is interderivable with (a particular case of) so-called Fine Structure Theorem on uniform re ection principles of U. Schmerl 15] .
I hope the results of this paper will convince the reader of the fact that rules in arithmetic are an interesting independent object of study; and that a detailed analysis how particular rules work not only often reveals peculiar e ects, but may have useful applications in other topics of proof theory.
